A less common ground for refusal and what practice shows

When a company wants to register a trademark, the Patent Office examines whether the sign meets the requirements of the law. In most cases, the problems are relatively familiar: the mark may lack sufficient distinctiveness, may directly describe the goods or services, or may use a word that has already become generic for a given type of product.

There is, however, one more particular ground for refusal. It is connected not so much with the market, competition, or the distinctiveness of the sign, but with something more sensitive: the values of society.

This is Article 11, paragraph 1, item 6 of the Law on Marks and Geographical Indications. According to this provision, marks that are contrary to public order or to accepted principles of morality shall not be registered.

At first glance, this sounds clear. In practice, however, the question is considerably more complex. When is a mark merely provocative? When is it a display of bad taste? And when does it cross the line and become incompatible with fundamental social values?

It is precisely this line that makes the ground less frequently applied, but also more difficult to assess.

The Bulgarian framework and its connection with EU law

The rule has been received into Bulgarian law. It reproduces the corresponding provisions of European Union law – Article 7(1)(f) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation and Article 4(1)(f) of Directive (EU) 2015/2436.

This has important practical significance. The Bulgarian provision must be interpreted in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Therefore, when considering whether a mark is contrary to public order or to accepted principles of morality, it is not enough to look only at the Bulgarian law. European case law must be taken into account as well.

Public order and accepted principles of morality – two distinct grounds

The wording “public order or accepted principles of morality” combines two separate grounds for refusal. Each of them can independently lead to a refusal of registration, but their logic is different.

When is a mark contrary to public order?

Public order is assessed by more objective criteria. The law does not provide an express definition of the concept, but the Methodological Guidelines of the Patent Office link it to the fundamental principles of the legal order and to the protection of values that society must safeguard unconditionally.

Under this ground, the examiner cannot simply say that a given mark “does not sound right” or “does not look appropriate.” They must rely on a specific legal rule, an international treaty, or a universal principle.

Typical examples are signs containing the names of terrorist or criminal organisations.

In the EUIPO’s practice in the “BIN LADIN” case, it was held that terrorist crimes are unconditionally contrary to the moral principles recognised in all civilised nations. On a similar basis, the Patent Office has refused registration of signs such as “MAFIA” and “ETA”, connected respectively with crime and with a terrorist organisation.

When is a mark contrary to accepted principles of morality?

With accepted principles of morality, the assessment is more delicate. Here it is not necessarily a matter of breaching a specific legal rule, but of the moral standard that society regards as normal and acceptable.

“Accepted principles of morality” encompass those rules of conduct that are not always written down in law but are perceived as part of public morality. The Constitutional Court has also noted that public morality is an area strongly connected with national traditions and culture.

This means that the assessment cannot be entirely abstract. It depends on the specific moment in time, on the society, on the cultural context, and on the way in which the relevant public would perceive the mark.

In other words, a sign may be unacceptable in one context but permissible in another.

Why does the distinction matter?

Public order and accepted principles of morality are often considered together. The Supreme Court of Cassation has held that accepted principles of morality form part of public order in the broad sense.

Nevertheless, the distinction matters in practice.

With public order, the examiner must point to a specific rule or principle that is affected. With accepted principles of morality, they must explain why the ordinary consumer would perceive the sign as morally unacceptable.

This is an essential difference. The law does not aim to protect the most easily scandalised person, nor to permit everything simply because someone else is impressed by nothing. What is sought is the balance — the perspective of a consumer with normal sensitivity and a normal degree of tolerance.

What are the assessment criteria according to the practice of the Patent Office?

The Methodological Guidelines of the Patent Office of 2025 summarise the administrative and judicial practice and set out several important principles.

First, the mark is assessed on its own merits. The question is whether the specific sign, with its particular features, is directed squarely against fundamental social norms.

Second, it is not enough for the sign merely to have some connection with unlawful or controversial conduct. Such a connection may be necessary, but it is not in itself sufficient for a refusal. The sign must directly affect fundamental social values.

Third, the standard of the average consumer is important. What is considered is neither the reaction of the most sensitive person nor that of the completely indifferent one. This is precisely why the Guidelines warn examiners to be careful about subjectivity.

Fourth, it matters greatly for which goods or services the mark is applied for.

One and the same sign may be problematic for some goods but permissible for others. The example of the “ETA” sign is illustrative. For T-shirts, such a sign could look like a provocation or a deliberate reference to a terrorist organisation. For geothermal heating systems, however, it was allowed, because for those goods and for the relevant public the likelihood of it being perceived as an insult or a glorification of terrorism is low.

This shows that context is decisive.

Which signs are most often refused?

From practice, several relatively stable groups of signs can be identified that usually create a problem.

Among them are signs with Nazi symbols, obscene gestures, vulgar or discriminatory words, including in a foreign language, where their meaning is sufficiently well known and understandable to the public.

Signs that contain or symbolise the names of narcotic substances can also be problematic. A typical example is the refusal of “CANNABIS” for tobacco products. A refusal may also follow where the spelling is deliberately or grammatically incorrect, if the meaning remains clear – for example, “KANABYS”.

This group also includes signs of a blasphemous character; the Guidelines give the example of “РОЖДЕСТВО ХРИСТОВО” (“NATIVITY OF CHRIST”).

Not every provocation is a ground for refusal

This is perhaps the most important practical takeaway.

The law does not prohibit every mark that is provocative, daring, or aesthetically questionable. The Methodological Guidelines expressly state that the ground does not apply where the mark is merely a display of “bad taste.”

This line has been confirmed by practice as well. Signs such as “BULLSHIT”, “FAKE”, and “HOLY WATER” have been accepted as registrable for certain goods and services.

In other words, for a refusal it is not enough for a sign to be crude, strange, or disliked by part of the public. It must genuinely conflict with fundamental social values.

There is a great difference between a sign that is unsophisticated or provocative as a marketing device, and a sign that undermines the foundations of public morality. The assessment under Article 11, paragraph 1, item 6 of the LMGI lies precisely in that difference.

European case law and the Fack Ju Göhte case

Until 2020, the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU on this ground was not particularly extensive. The judgment in the Fack Ju Göhte case, however, provided important guidance.

The case concerns a German production company that applied to register as an EU trade mark the title of an extremely successful comedy. The title is a deliberately distorted English expression with a vulgar sound.

The EUIPO refused the registration, holding that the sign was vulgar. The refusal was upheld by the Board of Appeal and by the General Court. The Court of Justice of the EU, however, set the decision aside.

The reason is important: the assessment of whether a sign is contrary to morality cannot be purely abstract. It is not enough to consider only the literal sound of the expression. The real social and cultural context must be taken into account, along with the way in which society perceives the sign and the specific evidence.

In that case, it mattered that the film had been widely distributed, that society had not perceived it as morally unacceptable, and that the national film regulator had even cleared it for a youth audience.

The Court also emphasised something else important: when applying this ground, freedom of expression under Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU must also be taken into account.

This judgment clearly shows that morality is not assessed in a vacuum. It is assessed in real life.

An illustration from the Bulgarian register: application No. 174890 “GLORY HOLE donuts”

An interesting and topical illustration of these principles can be seen in the Bulgarian register.

On 15 September 2024, the company GLORY HOLE DONUTS OOD filed application No. 174890 for the combined mark “GLORY HOLE donuts”. The sign consists of a stylised figurative logo and was applied for in respect of services in Class 43 – small restaurants serving coffee, tea and snacks, cafés, and food decoration.

On 15 January 2025, the application was published in Official Bulletin 01.1 of the Patent Office, and on 23 April 2026 a decision was taken to register it.

The case is interesting because the expression “glory hole” has an unambiguously vulgar sexual meaning in English slang. At first glance, this could appear to be a ground for refusal under Article 11, paragraph 1, item 6 of the LMGI.

But the very fact that the application reached publication and subsequently registration means that the examination on absolute grounds was carried out and no conflict with public order or accepted principles of morality was established.

This outcome is consistent with the principles discussed above.

First, the slang meaning is in a foreign language and is not as widely known to the average Bulgarian consumer as crude swear words or obviously vulgar expressions.

Second, the sign is used in connection with a pastry shop and doughnuts. A consumer with normal sensitivity will most likely perceive the mark precisely in that context – as the name of a place for food, and not as a direct vulgar reference.

Third, the double meaning will be accessible mainly to that part of the public that is already familiar with the English slang.

Therefore, in this case it is rather a matter of a provocative commercial choice, or of “bad taste” within the meaning of the Guidelines, but not of a sign that genuinely conflicts with accepted principles of morality.

Thus the application does not look like a departure from practice, but like a consistent application of the existing criteria. The examiner is not obliged to protect the most easily scandalised consumer, nor to censor every bolder marketing idea. They must refuse registration only where the sign actually undermines the foundations of the legal order or of morality.

Conclusion

The ground under Article 11, paragraph 1, item 6 of the LMGI sounds strict, but in practice it has narrower and more precise boundaries.

It applies to signs that directly affect fundamental social values – for example, names of terrorist organisations, Nazi symbols, crude vulgarity, discriminatory messages, or blasphemous signs.

Provocation, playfulness, and even mild indecency are not always sufficient. Especially where they are expressed in a foreign language, are not widely understood, and are placed in a harmless commercial context, they more often remain in the realm of bad taste rather than of legal prohibition.

For the practising lawyer, this means that before relying on this ground – whether in an opinion, an opposition, or advice to a client – it is worth asking three questions.

First, does the sign directly affect a fundamental social value, or does it merely look controversial and provocative?

Second, how would a consumer with normal sensitivity perceive it, rather than the most easily offended person?

Third, for which goods or services exactly is the mark applied for?

The answers to these questions usually show whether the case involves a genuine legal problem, or simply a bold, controversial, yet permissible commercial choice.